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MICHAEL NAEVE

The Future of the Natural Gas
Market: Regulation and Prices
This article will describe the forces that drive natural gas regulatory
policy. Federal gas policy will be affected by three underlying priciples:
I. Only regulate where it's necessary. That means restricing regulation to cases where abuse of monopoly power is possible. Under
normal market conditions the threat of such abuse is limited by
the existence of competition. Competition drives prices down to
marginal costs. Where possible, competition should be fostered
to allow for the removal of existing regulation. This is a policy
that has been followed in recent times. Under the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978,' sixty percent of domestic natural gas prices
have been deregulated at the wellhead.
2. Natural gas has become a tangible energy community. Gas now
faces stiff competition with other fuels for market share. Fuel
switching capacity has become quite extensive-twenty-five to
thirty percent of the market can switch fuels in the short-run,
while thirty-five to forty percent can switch in the long-run. Gas
no longer has a special protected niche in the market.
3. Pipeline companies are in two separate lines of business: the
transportation business, and the gas merchant business. Regulators now see pipeline companies differently than they did in the
past, when they viewed pipelines as being in one line of business-the gas business. As transporters, gas pipelines have inherent market power. They have control over a necessary facility
in the gas market. This aspect of the pipeline industry needs to
be regulated. As merchants, however, they have no inherent market power. Pipeline companies generally produce little of the gas
they sell. They merely serve as aggregators of supplies produced
by others. If other merchants are allowed to use the pipeline's
facilities, they can perform the same aggregation function. In the
past, however, pipelines have been able to gain undue market
power over gas sales by denying their competitors the facilities
that connect points of production and consumption.
What are the implications of these principles? First, the emphasis by
state and federal regulators should be to remove barrers to competition.
I. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §3301-3432 (1982).
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We need to provide more tools, and more flexibility, for firms to compete
for market share in changing market conditions.
Second, we will be concerned with guarding against pipelines leveraging their market power over transportation to gain unwarranted market
power over gas sales. This will involve a marriage of regulatory principles
with anti-trust principles. Regulatory principles are aimed at controlling
the use of existing market power. These tools must be used to control
pipeline transportation rates and practice. Anti-trust principles, in contrast, are aimed at preventing the accumulation of pipeline market power
over gas sales.
As we move from a highly regulated gas market to a more competitive
gas market, one will see a substantial increase in private anti-trust litigation. For example, Colorado Interstate Gas Pipeline was recently awarded
treble damages as a result of anti-trust action against Natural Gas Pipeline.' Private anti-trust actions may ultimately be more important than
the FERC in preventing the exercise of monopoly power by pipelines
over gas sales.
Finally, the FERC will undertake an examination of the relationship
between the pipelines and their affiliated suppliers. Chairman Martha
Hesse has announced that the Commission will address this issue in a
soon-to-be issued Notice of Inquiry into possible abuses and remedies.
In summary, the FERC is now adapting regulatory practice to fit the
new economic environment in the gas industry. Unfortunately, we face
numerous obstacles in the process. Our principle authority is derived from
the Natural Gas Act,' which is now more than 50 years old. This Act is
based on still older statutes and regulatory principles, as a result, we
frequently encounter difficulties accomodating these old principles in the
modem context. There is extensive legal precedent that we cannot simply
shrug off, which acts as a constraint on the kinds of modifications of
regulatory and anti-trust principles which have been described.
FUTURE OF GAS PRICES AND SUPPLIES
Today we are confronted with surplus supply and suppressed prices.
But what happens when the bubble bursts?
The term "gas bubble" is an expression which suggests that we have
a surplus of domestic natural gas supplies. Even a cursory review of the
gas reserve data shows that this is not the case. Indeed, if anything we
are facing a shortage rather than a surplus in gas supplies. The U.S.
proved reserves have decreased from a high of 293 tcf in 1967 to 185
2. Colorado Interstate Gas Pipeline v. FERC, 791 F.2d 803 (10th Cir. 1986).
3. Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §§717-717w (1982).
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tcf in 1986. If unmarketable Alaska north slope gas is excluded from the
reserve figures, the total proved reserve figures are further reduced to
152 tcf. Far from experiencing a build up in gas supplies, we have
witnessed a steady decline in our natural gas reserve base.
Thus today's bubble is not a surplus of reserves. Instead, it is little
more than a temporary surplus in gas deliverability. In short, despite the
gradual decline in gas reserves, on any given day gas producers currently
are capable of delivering gas supplies in excess of total market demand.
The emergence of today's deliverability surplus was caused by a variety
of factors, including the following:
I. The partial deregulation of wellhead gas prices under the Natural
Gas Policy Act forced natural gas into direct competition with
other primary fuels for the industrial energy market. During the
gas shortages of the late 1970s, many boiler fuel users of gas
were forced to equip their plants to burn fuel oil as a backstop
against natural gas curtailments. Today the high price of gas
relative to fuel oil, caused in part by the complicated incentive
pricing scheme of the NGPA, has temporarily priced gas out of
the boiler fuel market in some areas. In 1986 alone, natural gas
lost approximately .9 tcf in sales to fuel oil.
2. Higher gas prices have stimulated conservation in all segments
of the gas market.
3. The economics and technology of gas production have changed
such that producers now have the physical ability and the economic incentive to drain gas reservoirs at much higher rates of
production. This is especially true for wells in the federal outer
continental shelf, where production rates are unhampered by state
conservation or rateable take laws and where high exploration
and development costs require a more rapid recovery of investment.
4. The infill drilling incentives of the NGPA increased the deliverability of many interstate reservoirs without appreciably adding
to the overall reserve base.
5. There have been significant improvements in the infrastructure
for moving imports of Canadian supplies into domestic markets,
and changes in U.S. and Canadian energy policies have paved
the way for greater levels of gas imports.
6. Since the mid-1970s, domestic gas storage capacity has increased
by approximately twenty-five percent. This increase in total storage has masked any temporary shortfall between natural gas deliverability and consumption during periods of peak demand.
Although many of these factors are still at work, other more powerful
forces-primarily the drop in exploratory drilling-are gradually deflating
the deliverability bubble. For example, Merrill Lynch has predicted, based
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on drill rig activity in 1986, that the industry replaced only thirty-seven
percent of the supplies produced last year."
This leads to the question of when will the bubble end? To be more
precise, when will the gas industry be unable to satisfy the peak demands
of the market? I should state at the outset that the FERC has not attempted
to forecast the duration of the deliverability surplus. Most of the Commission's data gathering and analysis functions were transferred to the
Energy Information Agency in 1977 by the DOE Organization Act. As
a consequence, I have no special resources to bring to bear on this
question. Like many in the gas industry, however, I have reviewed studies
done by others and am prepared to accept the view that the bubble, as I
have defined it, could end within one or two winter heating seasonsdepending on the severity of the weather. Members of the Texas Railroad
Commission recently have expressed concern that the margin between
peak season deliverability and peak demand has become dangerously thin
in the Texas intrastate market. They predict possible spot shortages next
winter if prolonged frigid temperatures are experienced. Others have made
similar predictions for the interstate market, although most appear to
agree that the outlook for the interstate market is somewhat rosier than
that forecasted for Texas by the Railroad Commission. What is significant
about these predictions is that we are sufficiently close to a peak season
supply shortage that weather conditions could determine the difference
between a surplus and a temporary shortage.
Other reputable forecasters predict a more protracted life span for the
gas bubble. For example, the American Gas Association has predicted
that the bubble will continue until at least 1990, and perhaps even longer
if so-called "supplemented supplies" are taken into account." But I believe
that AGA has defined the bubble differently than I have. Instead of forecasting when peak demand will exceed peak deliverability, they have
predicted when annual demand will exceed annual deliverability. While
AGA's forecast may be correct as far as it goes, we probably will encounter winter deliverability problems-and therefore the end of the bubble as I have defined it-long before the period in which AGA predicts
equilibrium between annual supply and demand.
As to where seasonal shortages are likely to occur first, my best guess
is the Gulf Coast area. This region was picked for two reasons. First, it
has relatively little gas in storage. Most of the U.S. gas storage capacity
is located near the large consuming areas of the upper midwest, east coast
and California. As a result, gulf coast consumers are highly dependent
on wellhead deliverability to satisfy their needs. Second, when frigid
4. Cited in 17 INSTITUmE OF GAS TECHNOLOGY, GAS HIGHLIGHTS 17(1) (1987).
5. AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION, GAS ENERGY REVIEW: AGA 1987 OUTLoOK (1987).
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weather hits the gulf coast, demand increases at the same time that deliverability decreases. This is because the same cold weather that causes
homes and business to turn up their thermostats also causes gas wells to
freeze over. The simultaneous occurrence of demand peaks and well
freeze-overs could lead to shortages during the next prolonged cold spell.
Fortunately, this region has been spared from unusually harsh weather in
the past three years. But a near shortage in the Texas intrastate market
was narrowly avoided in 1983.
Today ninety-nine percent of all electric utility gas boilers and fiftysix percent of all industrial gas consumers have dual fuel capability.
Between thirty to forty percent of the total gas market is subject to fuel
switching over short- or medium-term periods. This competition for the
boiler market has led to the intergration of gas and oil markets.
Because of this integration, the experience of the late 1970s will not
be repeated during the next natural gas deliverability shortage. As supplies
begin to tighten during the peak winter heating season, prices under spot
and short-term contracts will begin to creep upward. As soon as the
delivered cost of spot gas exceeds that of residual fuel oil, some dual
fired boiler users will immediately switch to oil. If shortages still persist,
spot prices will rise a few more cents and additional boiler fuel users will
switch. This process of shrinking the gas boiler fuel market will continue
until supply and demand are brought into balance. The net result is that
instead of factories closing their doors as they did in 1975 and 1976, spot
prices will increase slightly and dual fired facilities will switch from gas
to fuel oil. Gas-dependent customers will be little affected by the seasonal
shortages until the boiler fuel market has been essentially backed out.
These initial curtailments will occur as a result of market pressure, not
regulatory intervention. Federal curtailment policies will not come into
play until after a substantial portion of gas consumers have voluntarily
left the system.
In addition, shortages will be more evenly distributed throughout the
pipeline grid, thereby lessening the threat of deep shortages on any one
system. In the 1970s, some pipelines were curtailing essential gas uses
while nearby pipelines were continuing to serve boiler fuel users. The
hardships and economic cost of curtailments were exacerbated because
shortages were concentrated on a handful of pipelines. This will not occur
again for a variety of reasons, including more flexible transportation,
abandonment regulations, and the current trend away from the rigid, longterm gas purchase contracts of the past. Today, supplies are more free to
respond to market pressure and flow to the points of greatest need.
Gas prices will respond to peak shortages. As previously mentioned,
the delivered price of spot gas will creep above that of residual fuel oil.
This is consistent with the normal rule of thumb that shortages result in
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higher prices. But keep in mind that gas companies are now selling into
an integrated hydrocarbon market. They are no longer selling gas: they
are selling Btus. As long as there is not a shortage of primary fuels (that
is, gas and oil), boiler fuel prices should not rise appreciably. During
modest peak season curtailments, gas will continue to be priced at a level
that backs out some but not all of the boiler fuel market.
Significant price increases will occur only during peak shortages that
are deep enough to displace most natural gas boiler fuel users. Given the
flexibility in today's market for spreading out shortages over the entire
pipeline network, it is unlikely that curtailments of this magnitude will
occur within the next three to four years. Furthermore, even if deep
shortages do occur, the resulting price increases will be short-lived. Once
peak season demand subsides, excess deliverability will reappear and spot
gas prices will naturally seek the level of the alternative marginal supplies
(in this case, fuel oil). In many cases, the alternative supplies may come
from competing sellers of gas, in which case gas prices could be driven
below the cost of fuel oil. Thus, we will see seasonal swings in spot gas
prices.
This is not to say that, except for periods of deep curtailment, all gas
prices will be perpetually capped by the price of fuel oil. I expect that
as peak shortages begin to appear, firm gas users will begin to offer
premium prices to lock up limited gas supplies during peak months. The
greater the threat of shortages, the greater the premium that essential users
will be willing to pay. Such a premium will be limited by the value of
the lowest cost alternative supplies for the next large group of gas users
(perhaps No. 2 fuel oil). But even essential gas users will be unwilling
to pay a premium for supplies delivered during non-peak periods.
Thus for the near- and mid-term future, average gas prices will remain
limited by the price of fuel oil plus a modest premium (for peak supplies,
both firm and interruptible). With prices so limited, the incentives available to producers to respond to seasonal gas shortages will be determined
in large part by the vagaries of the international crude oil market.
Forecasting oil prices is part economics and part political science.
Although I am neither an economist nor a political scientist, I will nonetheless offer an opinion on the subject. Despite the recent success of the
OPEC ministers in reaching an accord on oil prices and production levels,
I believe that it is unlikely that OPEC will be able to stabilize oil prices
for any extended period. I say this because I see a variety of irrestible
forces currently at work to undermine any agreement to stabilize prices.
These forces include the following:
1. Most major petroleum exporting nations are facing serious budget
problems resulting from the decline in oil prices and overly am-
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bitious revenue commitments made during the heyday of inflated
oil prices. With a near desperate need for cash flow, there is great
temptation to covertly circumvent the voluntary OPEC production
restraints. This temptation is exacerbated by the lack of a uniform
system of accounting for country by country production figures,
or enforceable sanctions against cheaters.
2. Total worldwide crude production capacity exceeds demand by
eight to ten million barrels per day [mbd]. Although OPEC producers are responsible for ninety-five percent of this surplus capacity, it is extremely difficult to keep that much oil off the market.
Furthermore, OPEC's share of the surplus is not evenly distributed
among the OPEC member countries. For example, the average
OPEC member is producing at approximately sixty percent of
capacity while Saudi Arabia is producing at forty-one percent
(3.75 mbd out of a total capacity of 9 mbd). The uneven allocation
of the production restraints creates internal conflicts that undermine the current agreement.
3. Not only is there a current surplus in production capacity, but
several OPEC producers (primarily those in the Persian Gulf)
could develop significant additional reserves for a matter of pennies. For example, Saudi Arabia is presently producing from only
fifteen of its fifty known fields.
4. At some point, the Iran and Iraq conflict will draw to an end.
Regardless of who wins, there will be a desire to rebuild the
production facilities and reclaim the market share held by the two
countries before the war. This could either result in more oil being
dumped on the market or, at the very least, it could create additional tension within the OPEC ranks.
5. Many of the OPEC members have conflicting strategic needs that
they seek to further through the OPEC pricing policies. For example, members with extensive reserves seek to establish moderate prices that will increase the long-term market share of crude
oil. OPEC members with rapidly depleting reserves, in contrast,
seek a high price policy to maximize short-term revenues while
their reserves hold out.
The combined effect of these and other factors will likely result in
unstable and relatively low oil prices in the immediate future.
This brings us back to the question of natural gas supplies in the wake
of the current bubble. Investment decisions by gas producers will be
affected by both the anticipated price for future supplies and by the degree
of confidence the producer, and his investors or lenders, have that the
anticipated price actually will be realized. I am aware of studies by the
Gas Research Institute and others which suggest that we will be able to
sustain sufficient North American gas production to supply anticipated
market needs with oil prices that gradually inflate from $20 in 1987 to
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approximately $27 in the year 2000.6 Not being an expert on the subject,
I have no basis to question their forecasts. I am concerned, however, that
a lack of producer and lender confidence in such prices--caused by the
unstable nature of world oil markets-will reduce the anticipated supply
response. For example, although a great many experts are predicting
prices in the $18-$20 range through 1990, I am told that most major oil
companies are making their investment decisions based on price thresholds of $15 and less. In addition, investors and lenders will be reluctant
to make capital commitments on the basis of unreliable revenue predictions. Based on recent experience, lenders in producing states will be
cautious in making loan commitments. Furthermore, the total resources
available for exploration loans will be substantially reduced due to reluctance by banks outside the producing states to purchase energy loans
initiated by regional lenders.
This suggests the possibility of a supply-constrained gas market in the
not too distant future. If this occurs, the supply inadequacies may be selfcorrecting. If supplies are so short as to back out the dual-fired gas market,
peak seasonal prices will rise to the level of No. 2 fuel oil or higher
thereby stimulating additional supplies. Further, higher seasonal prices
will increase incentives to develop additional storage capacity and supplemental peak shaving supplies.
In conclusion, the low-level and unpredictability of future oil prices
may cause a supply-constrained gas market in the near-term. However,
if current regulatory reforms are allowed to continue, supply shortages
will be more evenly distributed throughout the interstate pipeline network;
essential gas users will not suffer gas curtailments; the industry will make
necessary adjustments to changing market conditions; and we will not
see a recurrance of the hardships that resulted from the gas shortages of
the mid- 1970s.
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